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“THE WHOLE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
HISTORY OF ENGLAND IS A COMMENTARY 
ON THIS CHARTER”* 
CHARLES DONAHUE, JR.** 
 
“King John was not a good man,” Christopher Robin tells us, 
“[h]e had his little ways.”1 Christopher Robin was, in fact, reflecting 
the best scholarship of his day, 1927, when the poem was first 
published. Almost all historians in Victorian and Edwardian England 
believed that King John was irredeemably bad. He was so bad that 
the barons revolted against him. Stephen Langton, the wise 
archbishop of Canterbury, so the story went, harnessed the rebellion 
and drafted the cornerstone of English constitutional liberty, Magna 
Carta, to which the reluctant king was forced to consent on 15 June 
1215.2 
Out of evil comes good through the mediation of the Church. 
Not surprisingly, the most powerful exponent of this version of the 
story was the Right Reverend William Stubbs, D.D., the bishop of 
 
 *  © 2016 Charles Donahue, Jr. For the quotation in the title, see text at note 22 
infra. 
 **  Paul A. Freund Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. The author adds: This 
paper began life as a lecture given in Calgary, Alberta, in February of 1990 on the occasion 
of the visit of Lincoln Cathedral’s copy of the 1215 Charter to the Nickle Art Museum. I 
have refined the lecture over the years in my English Legal History course. The eight-
hundredth anniversary of the 1215 Charter has brought forth an outpouring of literature 
on the topic of Magna Carta. It would seem that everyone who knows anything about the 
English Middle Ages has been asked to say something about the Charter. (I guess I belong 
to the broad category; I am certainly not a specialist in either Magna Carta or thirteenth-
century England more generally.) Thirteen articles in History Today published since 2012 
have “Magna Carta” in the title, the tip of an underlying iceberg that will be explored by 
future historiographers. This paper remains a lecture, decorated now with footnotes, as 
requested by the Law Review, some of which have been kindly supplied by their assiduous 
cite-checkers. So far as the literature is concerned, I have taken borings in the iceberg. I 
had to be selective. I have certainly missed important contributions, and to the authors of 
those contributions I apologize. 
Note from the Editors: This Article is historical in nature, and, accordingly, the North 
Carolina Law Review has departed from its ordinary citation practices. 
 1. A. A. MILNE, NOW WE ARE SIX 2 (1st ed. 1927). 
 2. A review of the historiography may be found by John Gillingham, John, King of 
England, in 30 OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 158 (H.C.G. Matthew 
& Brian Harrison eds., 2004). A more comprehensive review, written at the height of the 
revisionist period, may be found in J. C. HOLT, KING JOHN (Historical Ass’n 1963) 
[hereinafter HOLT, KING JOHN]. 
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Oxford, and the greatest English constitutional historian of Victorian 
era.3 
Not surprisingly too, this story produced a counterstory in the 
succeeding generation.4 King John was more sinned against than 
sinning. He tried to bring order to an unruly England; he was 
interested in the details of administration. The rebellious barons were 
a group of reactionaries who wanted to return England to the days of 
the anarchy under King Stephen. Magna Carta, whether Langton was 
its draftsman or not, was a reactionary document. It can only be 
understood in feudal terms. Its value in later political debate, both at 
the end of the thirteenth century and most notably in the seventeenth, 
was a combination of symbolism, misunderstood history, and 
misinterpreted language. 
Modern historians tend to be more cautious, avoiding either the 
extremes of Stubbs’s view or those of the revisionists who 
 
 3. 1 WILLIAM STUBBS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND: ITS ORIGIN 
AND DEVELOPMENT 551–83 (5th ed. 1891); 2 WILLIAM STUBBS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
HISTORY OF ENGLAND: ITS ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT 1–165 (4th ed. 1887). As is 
frequently the case, reading Stubbs exposes a view more subtle than my caricatures of it in 
the text. For example, the way in which Stubbs divides his discussion of the Charter makes 
fairly clear that he thought, as do many modern historians, that what happened after 
John’s death had more lasting importance than did the adoption of the Charter in 1215. 
For Stubbs’s assessment of John’s character, we can do no better than to repeat the 
quotations that Janet Loengard has recently gathered together: “[T]here is nothing in him 
which for a single moment calls out our better sentiments; in his prosperity there is 
nothing that we can admire and in his adversity nothing that we can pity.	.	.	.	John has 
neither grace nor splendour, strength nor patriotism. His history stamps him as a worse 
man than many who have done much more harm	.	.	.	.” And again: “he is savage, filthy, 
and blasphemous in his wrath	.	.	.	.” William Stubbs, Preface, in 2 MEMORIALE FRATRIS 
WALTERI DE COVENTRIA: THE HISTORICAL COLLECTIONS OF WALTER OF COVENTRY 
xi, xv (William Stubbs ed., 1872), quoted in Janet S. Loengard, Introduction to MAGNA 
CARTA AND THE ENGLAND OF KING JOHN 1, 3 n.6 (Janet S. Loengard ed., 2010). 
 4. E.g., SIDNEY PAINTER, THE REIGN OF KING JOHN (1949). Painter, who died in 
1960, would not have disagreed with Christopher Robin about the character of King John. 
Painter described John as “an able but completely unscrupulous and opportunistic king.” 
Sidney Painter, Magna Carta, 53 AM. HIST. REV. 42, 42 (1947). His view, however, of the 
basically anachronistic nature of the Charter is ably described in brief compass in this article. 
(An expanded version of the paper, which he later quite radically edited for publication, may 
be found at Nicolas Vincent, More From the Painter Archive: Two Lost Articles on Magna 
Carta, MAGNA CARTA PROJECT (Apr. 2015), http://magnacarta.cmp.uea.ac.uk/read/feature
_of_the_month/Apr_2015_3 [http://perma.cc/682E-TSTA]). W. L. WARREN, KING JOHN 
(1978) [hereinafter WARREN, KING JOHN], was written at the height of the revisionist 
movement. HOLT, KING JOHN, note 2 supra, summarizes the findings of the revisionist 
movement and is already moving beyond it. The basically feudal character of the Charter 
was emphasized as early as W. S. MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA: A COMMENTARY ON THE 
GREAT CHARTER OF KING JOHN, WITH AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION (2d ed. 1914) and 
even more trenchantly in Edward Jenks, The Myth of Magna Carta, 4 INDEP. REV. 260, 260–
73 (1904). 
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characterized the last generation of historians.5 What I would like to 
do in this paper is give the readers enough information to make up 
their own minds. I would also like to offer an interpretation of the 
Charter that allows us to say that, despite some egregious errors in 
detail on both sides, both Stubbs and the revisionists were in some 
sense right. 
The overall picture of what happened is reasonably clear, 
although many of the details are not. For example, the four surviving 
original copies of the Charter are all dated at Runnymede, 15 June 
1215, but it is not clear that is the correct date of the Charter. It may 
be the date when the king and the barons agreed to compromise on a 
charter of liberties, the details of which were worked out in the 
following days.6 
The Character of King John and the Making of the 1215 Charter 
Let us begin with the character of King John, for much depends 
on our assessment of him.7 King John began his reign in 1199 as king 
of England, duke of Normandy, and lord of much of western France. 
He lost Normandy and the rest of northwestern France in battle in 
1203, and he never recovered it. Particularly disastrous was his 
attempt to recover it in 1214, which resulted in a crushing defeat of 
his allies at the battle of Bouvines. To the men of his day that may 
well have been his most important deficiency. John was probably not 
 
 5. For different, but nonetheless compatible views—in that they steer a middle 
ground between my caricatures of the views of preceding generations of historians—see 
the magisterial account of Professor Sir James Holt (d. 2014), J. C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 
(George Garnett & John Hudson eds., 3d ed. 2015) [hereinafter HOLT, MAGNA CARTA], 
and, equally magisterial, DAVID CARPENTER, MAGNA CARTA (2015) [hereinafter 
CARPENTER, MAGNA CARTA]. 
 6. This was Holt’s view, but the suggestion can be found at least as far back as 
Davis’s edition of Stubbs’s Select Charters. WILLIAM STUBBS, SELECT CHARTERS AND 
OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY FROM THE EARLIEST 
TIMES TO THE REIGN OF EDWARD THE FIRST 285 (H. W. C. Davis ed., rev. 9th ed. 1913) 
[hereinafter STUBBS, SELECT CHARTERS]. Holt’s view is now supported by his students 
Garnett and Hudson, Introduction to HOLT, MAGNA CARTA, note 5 supra, at 1, 25–31. 
Carpenter argues for the date that is on the document. David Carpenter, The Dating and 
Making of Magna Carta, in THE REIGN OF HENRY III, at 1, 1 (1966). He maintains this 
position in CARPENTER, MAGNA CARTA, note 5 supra, at 361–66. 
 7. For why an assessment of the character of John is necessary, see text between 
notes 67 and 68 infra. A short and eminently readable biography with a review of the 
historiography may be found in Gillingham, note 2 supra. Gillingham himself might be 
regarded as a “re-revisionist”: John was pretty bad. Book-length biographies include 
WARREN, KING JOHN, note 4 supra, and RALPH V. TURNER, KING JOHN (1994). For 
those who wish to pursue the question of John’s character into more recent literature, see 
Loengard, note 3 supra, at 2–5 and the literature cited in nn. 7–11, especially KING JOHN: 
NEW INTERPRETATIONS (S. D. Church ed., 1999). 
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a coward, but he was not the athlete that his brother Richard had 
been. Leadership in battle at the beginning of the thirteenth century 
depended on athletics, personal physical prowess. Athletes don’t like 
losers. If the team loses, the coach gets fired.8 
But there was more to it than that. Although King John probably 
was not the arch-villain that some of the chroniclers make him out to 
be, he was not, as Christopher Robin says, a good man. He was, and 
is, widely believed to have had his nephew Arthur murdered; perhaps 
he killed him himself.9 He was probably responsible for having Maud 
de Briouse and her son starved to death. One reason for their murder 
seems to have been that Maud knew too much about Arthur’s 
death.10 The same pattern was followed in the case of Peter of 
Wakefield, a millenarian heretic, whose prediction of the end to come 
included a prediction of the king’s death. Not only was Peter executed 
but also his son, who had nothing to do with his father’s predictions.11 
John may have attempted to seduce, perhaps rape would be a better 
term, the daughter of Robert fitz Walter. Robert, though himself not 
a candidate for sanctity, became a leader of the baronial opposition to 
him.12 
But he was not all bad. He was able to inspire great loyalty in his 
household. He did devote himself to the details of administration, 
something that England sorely needed after Richard I. When John 
died in 1216 he still was leading an army; he had his supporters.13 His 
misdeeds would certainly have disqualified him for the position of 
bishop of Oxford in Victorian England (and, I would hope, today), 
but judged against the standards of his own time he was better than 
some and no worse than many. 
Why then did he get such bad press? Because most of the 
chroniclers of John’s time were monks, and for them John’s worst act 
was his dispute with Pope Innocent III concerning the appointment of 
Stephen Langton to the see of Canterbury.14 This dispute led to 
 
 8. The comparison with Richard is particularly telling in WARREN, KING JOHN, note 
4 supra, at 59–60, 62–63. 
 9. TURNER, note 7 supra, at 13; WARREN, KING JOHN, note 4 supra, at 82–83. 
 10. TURNER, note 7 supra, at 13; WARREN, KING JOHN, note 4 supra, at 185–87. 
 11. TURNER, note 7 supra, at 13. 
 12. Id. at 216 retells the story without committing to its truth. WARREN, KING JOHN, 
note 4 supra, at 230, does not believe it. 
 13. Numerous authors have made this point. See, e.g., Gillingham, note 2 supra, at 
167, and sources cited therein.  
 14. John Gillingham has emphasized that not all of the chroniclers of John were 
monks. This makes the account of the “Anonymous of Béthune,” whose author may have 
been a clerk, but who writes in French and espouses secular values, particularly important. 
Our impression of John is not improved by reading the Anonymous. See generally John 
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England being laid under a papal interdict from 1208 to 1213. The 
pope excommunicated John in 1209 and deposed him in 1213 (but the 
letters of deposition were never published), and in a remarkable 
reversal accepted his offer of homage in the same year and became 
his feudal lord. The years of the interdict were a bad period for the 
church in England, particularly for the monasteries, but the evidence 
suggests that many Englishmen supported John in his struggle with 
the pope, or, at least, did not actively oppose him. Neither the 
interdict nor John’s relations with the Church were of central 
importance to Magna Carta.15 
That, in turn, would suggest that Stephen Langton, who was not 
himself experienced in English political affairs, is an unlikely 
candidate for the draftsman of Magna Carta. He probably attempted 
to mediate between the barons and the king. He certainly got into 
trouble with the pope for having been too favorable to the barons. 
But except for clauses in favor of the church that were added to the 
beginning and end of the Charter after the barons had presented their 
petition, probably early in June of 1215, Langton was probably not 
directly involved in writing the Charter.16 Would that we knew who 
was, but we don’t. 
 
Gillingham, The Anonymous of Béthune, King John and Magna Carta, in MAGNA CARTA 
AND THE ENGLAND OF KING JOHN, note 3 supra, at 27, 27. 
 15. Pope Innocent III quashed the election of John de Gray, bishop of Norwich, 
John’s candidate, on the ground that the election was uncanonical, and then persuaded the 
monks of Canterbury to elect Stephen Langton. Langton was unacceptable to John, 
because he had spent too much time as a professor in Paris. A brief account of the dispute 
may be found in Gillingham, note 2 supra, at 163. The fullest account is C. R. CHENEY, 
POPE INNOCENT III AND ENGLAND (Päpste und Papsttum [Popes and Papacy] Band 9, 
1976). 
 16. For a much more nuanced account, see D. A. Carpenter, Archbishop Langton and 
Magna Carta: His Contribution, His Doubts and His Hypocrisy, 126 ENG. HIST. REV. 
1041, 1041 (2011), with substantial criticism of the view of John W. Baldwin, Master 
Stephen Langton, Future Archbishop of Canterbury: The Paris Schools and Magna Carta, 
123 ENG. HIST. REV. 811, 836 (2008), which attempts to restore the centrality of Langton’s 
role on the basis, among other things, of his teaching at Paris prior to becoming 
archbishop, and the “Unknown Charter.” Prior to Baldwin, David d’Avray also called 
attention to Langton’s political teaching in Magna Carta: Its Background in Stephen 
Langton’s Academic Exegesis and Its Episcopal Reception, 38 STUDI MEDIEVALI 423, 
423–38 (1997). For what the information is worth (and it’s not much), I find Carpenter’s 
argument that Langton was not involved in the drafting of the Articles of the Barons 
powerful (Baldwin would probably not have disagreed), the connection between Langton 
and the “Unknown Charter” problematical (Baldwin and Carpenter disagree on this), but 
the context of Langton’s general ideas helpful in “explaining” the Charter and particularly 
Langton’s role in the reissue of 1225 (Carpenter does not seem to disagree). See note 75 
infra and accompanying text for further information. 
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Rebellion had been in the wind at least as early as 1212. Its 
leaders seem to have been Robert fitz Walter, just mentioned, and 
Eustace de Vesci, who also claimed to have a personal grievance 
against the king.17 In 1213 and 1214 John was involved in a grand 
coalition with the Holy Roman Emperor and the count of Flanders 
against Philip Augustus, the king of France. John was attempting to 
recover Normandy. John’s allies were crushingly defeated at the 
battle of Bouvines in 1214. The unusually heavy taxation that 
preceded John’s French campaign, John’s increasingly erratic 
attempts to coerce and cajole the baronage into supporting him, the 
defeat at Bouvines, and the hope that the pope would support them 
probably combined in January of 1215 to bring a large group of 
barons into open confrontation with John in demanding reforms. In 
early May of 1215 the barons defied John.18 That is a technical term. It 
means to withdraw feudal allegiance from one’s lord on the ground 
that one’s lord has seriously wronged one. The barons were operating 
in a world that they knew. In mid-May they captured London. In June 
of 1215, they forced John to agree to the Great Charter. In August of 
1215 the pope relieved John of his oath to obey the Charter, on the 
ground—among others and not without support in the events—that 
the oath had been taken under duress. Shortly thereafter the pope 
died. The last year of John’s life was spent in battle with the barons, 
the more extreme of whom had invited Louis, the son of King Louis 
VII of France (and later himself King Louis VIII), to become king of 
England.19 
The moderates got control of the government after John’s death 
in 1216. Under the leadership of William the Marshall, the earl of 
Pembroke, they reissued the Charter in 1216 in the name of the ten-
year-old king, Henry III. They issued it again in 1217. Henry III 
issued it in his own name in 1225. Each time it was reissued the 
Charter was changed, not drastically, but enough to show that varying 
political and administrative settlements were at work. Had the 
process of reissuing the Charter with changes continued the Charter 
might have become a constitutional document in the real sense, but in 
1297, after a dispute between Edward I and his barons, the 1225 
 
 17. For the full story, see J. C. HOLT, THE NORTHERNERS: A STUDY IN THE REIGN 
OF KING JOHN 80 (1992). 
 18. For a modern British judge’s explanation of these events, see Lord Judge [Igor 
Judge, Baron Judge], Magna Carta, in MAGNA CARTA, RELIGION AND THE RULE OF 
LAW 19, 25 (Robin Griffith-Jones & Mark Hill eds., 2015).  
 19. The most recent account of these events is CARPENTER, MAGNA CARTA, note 5 
supra, at 274–309, 373–411, but the stripped-down version in the text can be supported 
from any of the standard accounts. 
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Charter was confirmed and the text fixed.20 Until the second quarter 
of the fifteenth century, every king reconfirmed the Charter as it 
stood. Today, four of its provisions are still law in England (cc. 1, 9, 
29, and the last clause of the 1225 Charter as confirmed in 1297, 
sometimes numbered 37). The rest have been repealed by statute, 
many of quite recent vintage, despite the “constitutional” status of the 
document.21 
The Text of the Charter 
Because the Charter became so much a symbol over the 
subsequent centuries, it is hard to understand it in its context. It 
certainly is not “An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the 
Subject” as the English Bill of Rights was called in 1689, nor, as 
Stubbs would have it, is “[t]he whole of the Constitutional History of 
England	.	.	.	a commentary on this charter	.	.	.	.”22 The Charter is not, 
however, an attempt by the barons to turn back the clock, to go back 
to the bad old days of King Stephen in the mid-twelfth century or 
even the good old days of King Henry I at the beginning of the 
twelfth century. 
In order to show why this is so, we ought to look more closely at 
the Charter itself.23 The order of the clauses seems jumbled, and we 
can understand it better if we regroup them24: 
 
 20. Still the best account of the thirteenth-century history of the Charter is FAITH 
THOMPSON, THE FIRST CENTURY OF MAGNA CARTA: WHY IT PERSISTED AS A 
DOCUMENT (1925). For the reissues in 1216, 1217, and 1225, see CARPENTER, MAGNA 
CARTA, note 5 supra, at 404–29. 
 21. 10(1) HALSBURY’S STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND WALES 81–84 (4th ed. 2013). 
 22. Compare STUBBS, SELECT CHARTERS, note 6 supra, at 291, with WILLIAM 
STUBBS, SELECT CHARTERS AND OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS OF ENGLISH 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE REIGN OF EDWARD 
THE FIRST 296 (8th ed. 1900) (the last edition to appear in Stubbs’s lifetime, where the 
same quotation is found). 
 23. Magna Carta is written in Latin. It is not particularly difficult Latin, and the 
reader who has any understanding of Latin at all really should use the original text. The 
most recent edition of the 1215 Charter, with a careful collation of the four surviving 
originals, is in CARPENTER, MAGNA CARTA, note 5 supra, at 36–69. Holt’s edition may be 
found in HOLT, MAGNA CARTA, note 5 supra, at 378–98. Carpenter’s edition is to be 
preferred, though the differences are not great. Holt’s also includes the 1225 Charter, id. at 
420–28. Both cited editions of the 1215 Charter include a translation. I prefer Carpenter’s; 
it is more literal, but, once more, the differences are not great. I cannot recommend the 
translation most commonly used in the United States: SOURCES OF ENGLISH 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 115–26 (Carl Stephenson & Frederick George Marcham eds., 
1972). Anyone who translates “dos” in c. 7 as “dowry” cannot be trusted. The Stephenson 
and Marcham translation does, however, attempt to show how various clauses of the 1215 
Charter were modified in subsequent reissues. 
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Four of the clauses of the 1215 Charter deal with the church (cc. 
1, 22, 42, 46),25 of which the most important is the first clause, a 
general guarantee of the liberties of the church26: 
[We i]n the first place, have granted to God and by this our 
present charter have confirmed, for us and our heirs in 
perpetuity, that the English church is to be free, and is to have 
its rights in whole and its liberties unharmed, and we wish it so 
to be observed; which is manifest from this, namely that the 
liberty of elections, which is deemed to be of the greatest 
importance and most necessary for the English church, by our 
free and spontaneous will, before the discord moved between us 
 
Still, the only complete clause-by-clause commentary on the 1215 Charter is 
MCKECHNIE, note 4 supra, at 184–480. It was a remarkable work of scholarship in its time, 
and it has lasted far too long. Both Holt and, particularly, Carpenter comment on all the 
clauses. One must, however, use the indices to find the commentary, which is scattered 
throughout both books. A website, known as “The Magna Carta Project,” on which a 
number of scholars, including Carpenter, are collaborating, is designed to replace 
McKechnie once and for all, but as of this writing (5 Sept. 2015) commentary is available 
on only twenty-eight of the sixty chapters. Magna Carta 1215, MAGNA CARTA PROJECT,	
http://magnacarta.cmp.uea.ac.uk/read/magna_carta_1215	[http://perma.cc/TP3M-EHNE] 
[hereinafter Magna Carta Project]. 
 24. Organizing the Charter is not for the faint of heart. Not only does it involve 
imposing categories on the material that almost certainly were not in the minds of the 
drafters, but it also involves committing one’s self to a single category when many clauses 
splay over modern categories. This organization is my own. Carpenter has a very different 
one, one more faithful to the organization of the Charter. CARPENTER, MAGNA CARTA, 
note 5 supra, at 25–32. A topical analysis closer to, but not the same as, mine may be found 
on the Magna Carta Project, note 23 supra. I have taken this opportunity to revise 
somewhat my organization, which I have been peddling to English Legal History classes 
for many years. 
 25. Magna Carta Project, note 23 supra, agrees with my characterization, and adds c. 
60 and “Suffix B” (otherwise known as c. 63). I don’t disagree, but have chosen to 
categorize everything that appears after c. 59 as dealing with the administration of the 
Charter, rather than substantive provisions. 
 26. In primis concessisse deo et hac presenti carta nostra confirmasse, pro 
nobis et heredibus nostris in perpetuum, quod Anglicana ecclesia libera 
sit, et habeat jura sua integra, et libertates suas illesas; et ita volumus 
observari quod apparet ex eo quod libertatem electionum, que maxima 
et magis necessaria reputatur ecclesie Anglicane, mera et spontanea 
voluntate, ante discordiam inter nos et Barones nostros motam, 
concessimus et carta nostra confirmavimus, et eam obtinuimus a 
Domino Papa Innocentio tercio confirmari; quam et nos observabimus 
et ab heredibus nostris in perpetuum bona fide volumus observari. 
CARPENTER, MAGNA CARTA, note 5 supra, at 38. The large boldface capital at the 
beginning of the Latin is the way that Carpenter indicates that there was a large capital in 
the original. Marking these produces an organization of the Charter that is somewhat 
different from the modern clause numbers. The translation in the text is from id. at 39, 
with the word in brackets added to make it make sense (the main verb is in what is now 
described as the “prologue”); the italics, here and throughout, indicate what was not 
carried over into subsequent reissues. 
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and our barons, we granted and confirmed by our charter, and 
obtained its confirmation from the lord pope, Innocent the third, 
which we shall both observe and wish to be observed by our 
heirs in perpetuity in good faith. 
Guarantee of the peace of the church was in the first clause in the 
English coronation oath in the tenth century, and it remained a part 
of the coronation oath throughout the Middle Ages and beyond.27 
This guarantee clause, however, is broader.28 It has possible parallels 
in what has come to be known as the “Coronation Charter” of Henry 
I.29 The provision in the 1215 Charter about liberty of election of 
bishops did not survive into the 1216 Charter, and the system actually 
used for election of bishops throughout the Middle Ages gave the 
king more say in the choice.30 
Two of the provisions deal with cities, citizens, burgesses, and 
boroughs (cc. 13, 41), and another five deal with commercial matters 
(cc. 9, 10, 11, 33, 35).31 Of these, probably the most important are the 
guarantees of the liberties of the city of London and other towns, and 
the attempt to impose a uniform system of weights and measures.32 
And the city of London is to have all its ancient liberties and 
free customs, by both land and water. 
 
 27. 1 FELIX LIEBERMANN, DIE GESETZE DER ANGELSACHSEN [The Laws of the 
Anglo-Saxons] 214–17 (1903); 1 THE STATUTES OF THE REALM 108 (London 1810). 
 28. The general principle appears again in what Holt and Carpenter call “c. 63”: 
“Quare volumus et firmiter praecipimus quod Anglicana ecclesia libera sit	.	.	.	.” 
CARPENTER, MAGNA CARTA, note 5 supra, at 68; HOLT, MAGNA CARTA, note 5 supra, 
at 398. 
 29. In the recent critical edition by Richard Sharpe, Henry I’s Coronation Charter, 
EARLY ENG. LAWS PROJECT (2016), http://www.earlyenglishlaws.ac.uk/laws/texts/hn-
cor/view/#edition,1/translation,1 [http://perma.cc/7R7U-SGSA] (note references and variants 
omitted): “ego respectu dei et amore quem erga uos <omnes> habeo, sanctam dei ecclesiam 
in primis liberam facio, ita quod nec [eam] uendam nec ad firmam ponam, nec mortuo 
archiepiscopo seu episcopo siue abbate aliquid accipiam de dominio ecclesie uel de 
hominibus eius donec successor in eam ingrediatur.” Garnet and Hudson note the parallel of 
“in primis” and the first words of c. 1. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA, note 5 supra, at 17–18. 
 30. For the system that was in use later on, see KATHERINE HARVEY, EPISCOPAL 
APPOINTMENTS IN ENGLAND, c. 1214–1344: FROM EPISCOPAL ELECTION TO PAPAL 
PROVISION (2014); see generally W. A. PANTIN, THE ENGLISH CHURCH IN THE 
FOURTEENTH CENTURY (1955). 
 31. Magna Carta Project, note 23 supra, categorizes differently: “Miscellaneous”: c. 13; 
“Trade”: cc. 33, 35, 41; “Money”: c. 9; “Jews”: cc. 10, 11. 
 32. Et civitas Londoniarum habeat omnes antiquas libertates et liberas 
consuetudines suas, tam per terras, quam per aquas. 
 
Preterea volumus et concedimus quod omnes alie civitates, et burgi, et 
ville, et portus, habeant omnes libertates et liberas consuetudines suas. 
CARPENTER, MAGNA CARTA, note 5 supra, at 42, 44; translation in id. at 43, 45. 
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In addition, we wish and grant that all other cities and 
boroughs, and villas and ports, have all their liberties and free 
customs. 
The guarantee of the liberties of London and other towns seems 
rather vague, but many cities and towns by this time, and certainly 
London,33 had their own borough charters. 
The attempt to impose a uniform system of weights and 
measures is found in clause 3534: 
There is to be one measure of wine through all our kingdom, 
and one measure of ale, and one measure of corn, namely the 
quarter of London, and one width of tinted cloths, and russets 
and haubergets, namely two ells within the borders. Moreover, 
for weights it is to be as for measures. 
This clause was not an immediate success, but the principle was an 
important one, to be worked out over the centuries.35 
Nineteen of the provisions deal with feudal relationships 
between the king and his tenants-in-chief, of which eleven clauses 
deal with relief, primer seisin, and the king’s wardship of widows and 
infant heirs (cc. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 37, 43, 44, 53), and eight deal with 
levying feudal scutages (payments in lieu of personal military service) 
and aids (cc. 12, 14, 15, 16, 26, 27, 29, 32).36 There are so many of these 
that choosing examples is hard. Let us focus on clause 2, fixing reliefs 
for earldoms and baronies. It was at the head of the Articles of the 
Barons37: 
 
 33. See BRITISH BOROUGH CHARTERS, 1042–1216 (Adolphus Ballard ed., 1913). 
Ballard did not edit the charters, but organized their contents, relying on previous editions 
or, in some cases, manuscripts. See his list of sources, id. at xxvi–xxxiii. 
 34. Una mensura vini sit per totum regnum nostrum, et una mensura 
cervisie, et una mensura bladi, scilicet Quartarium Londoniense, et una 
latitudo pannorum tinctorum et Russetorum et Halbergettorum, scilicet 
due ulne infra listas. De ponderibus autem sit ut de mensuris. 
CARPENTER, MAGNA CARTA, note 5 supra, at 50; translation in id. at 51. 
 35. See, e.g., the so-called Assise of Weights and Measures, in 1 THE STATUTES OF 
THE REALM 204–05 (London 1810) (of uncertain date, but probably late thirteenth or 
early fourteenth century); Stat. 14 Edw. 3, stat. 1, c. 12 (1340), in supra 1 THE STATUTES 
OF THE REALM, at 285; Stat. 25 Edw. 3, stat. 5, cc. 9–10 (1352), in supra 1 THE STATUTES 
OF THE REALM, at 321–22. 
 36. Magna Carta Project, note 23 supra, is largely in accord, dividing my subcategories 
somewhat differently between “Feudal” and “Money,” and putting four clauses into more 
specific categories: “Feudal”: cc. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 16, 29, 32, 37, 43; “Money”: cc. 12, 14, 15, 26, 
27; “Women”: cc. 7, 8; “Forest”: cc. 44, 53. 
 37. Si quis comitum vel baronum nostrorum, sive aliorum tenentium de 
nobis in capite per servicium militare, mortuus fuerit, et cum decesserit 
heres suus plene etatis fuerit et relevium debeat, habeat hereditatem 
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If any of our earls or barons, or others holding from us in chief 
by knight service, dies and when he dies his heir is of full age 
and owes relief, he is to have his inheritance by the ancient 
relief; namely the heir or heirs of an earl for a whole barony of 
an earl by a hundred pounds; the heir or heirs of a baron for a 
whole barony by a hundred pounds; the heir or heirs of a knight 
for the whole fee of a knight by a hundred shillings at most; and 
who owes less is to give less according to the ancient custom of 
fees. 
One hundred shillings for a knight’s fee was already pretty standard. 
Prior to the Charter, however, baronies and earldoms were assessed 
at what the traffic would bear and sometimes at what it wouldn’t bear. 
The earls and barons, particularly the earls, were clearly the winners 
in this clause.38 
Twenty of the provisions deal with the administration of justice 
(cc. 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 34, 36, 38, 39, 40, 44, 45, 52, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 
59), including the famous due process clause (c. 39, later 29).39 We will 
deal with some of these in more detail shortly. 
Eleven of the provisions deal with miscellaneous administrative 
matters (cc. 23 [distraint for repair of bridges and dikes], 25 [fixing 
amount of farms], 28 [seizure of foodstuffs for the king], 30 [seizure of 
animals for king’s service], 31 [seizure of wood for royal works], 47 
[forests], 48 (forests), 49 [hostages], 50 [removal of named ministers 
and their relatives], 51 [removal of foreign knights and soldiers], 53 
[adjusting forest boundaries]).40 
The final clause, or clauses, depending on whose numbering you 
use (cc. 60–63 in Holt’s and Carpenter’s numbering; c. 60 in Stubbs’s), 
deals with the administration of the Charter. 
 
suam per antiquum relevium; Scilicet heres vel heredes comitis de 
Baronia comitis integra per centum Libras; heres vel heredes baronis de 
Baronia integra per centum Libras; heres vel heredes militis de feodo 
militis integro per centum solidos ad plus; et qui minus debuerit minus 
det secundum antiquam consuetudinem feodorum. 
CARPENTER, MAGNA CARTA, note 5 supra, at 38; translation in id. at 39. 
 38. CARPENTER, MAGNA CARTA, note 5 supra, at 213–14; HOLT, MAGNA CARTA, 
note 5 supra, at 256–57.  
 39. Magna Carta Project, note 23 supra, is largely in accord, placing four chapters in 
more specific categories, and duplicating four chapters: “Justice”: cc. 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 
34, 36, 38, 39, 40, 52, 54, 55, 56, 57 (to which it adds c. 22, duplicated in “Church”, and c. 
32, duplicated in “Feudal”); “Forest”: c. 44; “King’s officers”: c. 45; “Wales and Scotland”: 
cc. 58, 59 (where cc. 56, 57 are duplicated). 
 40. Magna Carta Project, note 23 supra, divides these among less anachronistic 
categories: “Miscellaneous”: cc. 23, 49; “Money”: c. 25; “King’s officers”: cc. 28, 30, 31, 50, 
51; “Forest”: cc. 47, 48, 53. 
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The Place of Magna Carta in English Constitutional History 
Clearly this is not a bill of rights in either the modern or in the 
seventeenth-century sense. Very few of the clauses are on that level 
of generality. The vast majority assume a social and legal system for 
which we have no better a term than “feudal” and that can only be 
understood in that context.41 In this context it is an anachronism to 
think in terms of individual rights against the state, and the notion of 
a bill of rights is dependent on that idea. Within this context, the 
clauses of the Charter state principles and make “fixes.” 
If we leave out the matters personal to John (of which there are 
relatively few: the release of hostages, the return of wrongfully 
obtained land and fines, the expulsion of foreign soldiers and 
ministers, specific dealings with the Welsh and Scots) and the method 
of enforcement, none of which survived into the 1216 Charter, this is 
not a revolutionary document.42 Nor, in my view or in that of most 
modern commentators, such as Holt and Carpenter, is it a reactionary 
document. 
To test this view, let us look at the topic about which there are 
more clauses than any other: justice. If the barons had been trying to 
restore the situation as it had existed before the time of John’s father, 
Henry II, they certainly would have tried to dismantle the system of 
justice that had been instituted by the assizes of Henry II, particularly 
the assizes of novel disseisin and mort d’ancestor, which were 
substantially interfering with the power of the barons’ courts. In the 
case of the former, the aggrieved party had direct (and rapid) access 
to the central royal courts if he claimed to have been disseised by the 
lord “unjustly and without a judgment” and, in the case of the latter, 
similar access was allowed to the central royal courts if the claim was 
that his immediate ancestor had been seised on the day of his death 
 
 41. Like many medieval historians, I have become uncomfortable with using the term 
“feudal.” See, e.g., SUSAN REYNOLDS, FIEFS AND VASSALS: THE MEDIEVAL EVIDENCE 
REINTERPRETED 1–3 (1994). We have, however, no better term to describe the social, 
legal, and governmental structure of England at the turn of the thirteenth century. That 
structure is why, as the next sentence in the text suggests, we cannot imagine the Charter 
as creating individual rights against the state. 
 42. MAGNA CARTA (1215), c. 49 (release of hostages), c. 50 (named ministers and 
their relatives), c. 51 (foreign knights and soldiers), c. 52 (wrongfully obtained land), c. 55 
(wrongfully obtained fines), cc. 56–59 (specific dealings with the Welsh and Scots). The 
method of enforcement (cc. 60–63) was quite radical. It called for a council of twenty-five 
barons who would sit as a kind of appellate court over the king’s judgments. Had this 
continued, England would have had a quite different form of government throughout the 
rest of the Middle Ages. For further information see note 70 infra. 
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and that someone else was now on the land.43 The Charter not only 
does not seek to upset the assizes, but clause 18 insists that the assizes 
be taken four times a year in each county.44 Clause 17 not only does 
not seek to upset the central royal courts but creates a branch of them 
at a fixed place, normally at Westminster, presumably so that litigants 
might find them easily.45 Clause 24 ensures a monopoly of serious 
criminal cases to the central royal courts.46 Clause 34 could be 
 
 43. For mort d’ancestor and novel disseisin, see THE TREATISE ON THE LAWS AND 
CUSTOMS OF THE REALM OF ENGLAND COMMONLY CALLED GLANVILL 149–57, 167–70 
(doubled) (G. D. G. Hall, 2d ed. 1993) [hereinafter GLANVILL]. For what Henry II did 
(and for what he was trying and not trying to do), see S. F. C. MILSOM, THE LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK OF ENGLISH FEUDALISM: THE MAITLAND LECTURES GIVEN IN 1972 
(1976) [hereinafter MILSOM, LEGAL FRAMEWORK]. Many readers find this book difficult. 
It can be approached through the long review by Robert C. Palmer, 79 MICH. L. REV. 
1130 (1981). The late S. F. C. Milsom has his critics. I remain attracted to the power of 
Milsom’s vision while recognizing that his abstract scheme was not always applied. The 
best collection of evidence of the messiness of the reality is found in 2 JOHN HUDSON, 
THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: 871–1216, chs. 21–24 (2012) 
[hereinafter 2 HUDSON, OXFORD HISTORY], with references to his earlier work. We will 
return to Henry’s changes and Milsom’s ideas about them in the text and note 68 infra. 
 44. Recognitiones de nova dissaisina, de morte antecessoris, et de ultima 
presentatione, non capiantur nisi in suis comitatibus et hoc modo. 
 
Nos, vel, si extra regnum fuerimus, capitalis Justiciarius noster, mittemus 
duos justiciarios per unumquemque comitatum per quattuor vices in 
anno, qui, cum quattuor militibus cuiuslibet comitatus electis per 
comitatum, capiant in comitatu et in die et loco comitatus assisas 
predictas. 
  
Recognitions of novel disseisin, mort d’ancestor, and of darrein 
presentment, are not to be taken unless in their counties and in this way. 
 
We or, if we are out of our kingdom, our chief justiciar shall send two 
justices through each county four times a year, who, with four knights of 
each county, elected by the county court are to take the aforesaid assizes, 
in the county court and on the day and in the place of the county court.  
CARPENTER, MAGNA CARTA, note 5 supra, at 44, 46; translation in id. at 45, 47. The 
demand that the assizes be held four times a year in every county was unrealistic. It was 
reduced to once a year in the 1217 reissue, and not even this was always achieved. 
 45. Communia placita non sequantur curiam nostram sed teneantur in 
aliquot	certo	loco. 
 
Common pleas are not to follow our court but are to be held in some 
specified place. 
Id. at 44; translation in id. at 45. 
 46. Nullus vicecomes, Constabularius, Coronatores, vel alii ballivi nostri, 
teneant	placita corone nostre.  
 
No sheriff, constable, coroners or other of our bailiffs are to hold pleas 
of our crown. 
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interpreted as being in opposition to the reforms of Henry II,47 but 
subsequent events strongly suggest that it was directed at a much 
narrower aim: the issuance of a generalized precipe writ, what 
Glanvill calls the “writ of first summons,”48 without a statement in the 
writ as to why jurisdiction in the central royal courts is appropriate in 
the first instance. Such generalized writs ceased to be issued after the 
Charter, to be replaced by the writ of right in capite, the writ of right 
quia dominus remisit curiam, and a proliferation of writs of entry.49 
 
Id. at 46; translation in id. at 47. The awkward mixture of singulars and plurals was carried 
over into the 1225 reissue. This may be an indication that we are going to find substantive 
changes, authorized at some high level, not merely editorial changes, in the reissues. 
 47. Breve quod vocatur precipe decetero non fiat alicui de aliquo tenemento unde 
liber homo possit amittere curiam suam. 
 The writ which is called precipe is not to be made out henceforth to anyone for 
any tenement whereby a free man could lose his court. 
Id. at 50; translation in id. at 51. 
 48. For Glanvill’s writ de prima summonitione facienda, see GLANVILL, note 43 supra, 
at 5, and the brief but learned note on the nine writs precipe in the treatise, id. at 179–80. 
 49. The origins of this interpretation go back before Michael T. Clanchy’s Magna 
Carta, Clause Thirty-Four, 79 ENG. HIST. REV. 542 (1964), which had just appeared when 
Hall wrote his note on writs precipe. GLANVILL, note 43 supra, at 179–80. Clanchy’s brief 
article, however, has all of the elements just outlined in the text. The idea was developed 
extensively in MILSOM, LEGAL FRAMEWORK, note 43 supra. The puzzle is how to explain 
the fact that when men who had been instrumental in having c. 34 put in the Charter got 
control of the government during the minority of Henry III and reissued the Charter three 
times, all with this clause, they nonetheless not only allowed the Chancery to continue to 
issue writs precipe returnable in the central royal courts, but also allowed such writs to 
proliferate in numerous forms of writs of entry—and nobody seemed to object. 
The answer would seem to be that all the forms of writs precipe after 1216 that are 
returnable in the central royal courts contain within them an explanation of why 
jurisdiction in the central royal courts is appropriate without referral to the court of the 
lord of whom the demandant (plaintiff) claims to hold. This is obvious in the case of the 
writ of right in capite. The demandant claims to hold of the king in chief, and the court in 
which the writ ought to be returned is the central royal court. It is only slightly less obvious 
in the case where the lord has remitted his court (quia dominus remisit curiam). There is 
not much point having a writ returned in a court where the holder of the court has already 
said that he cannot or will not hear the case. 
Explanation of the writs of entry is more complicated. The key here, at least in 
Milsom’s view, is that writs of entry involve “downward-looking claims.” Unlike the writ 
of right, novel disseisin, and mort d’ancestor, all of which can, and in Milsom’s view 
normally do, involve a claim by a demandant that his lord has done him wrong, writs of 
entry involve a claim by the lord that the tenant (defendant), having entered, perhaps 
rightfully, now no longer belongs there: He was a tenant for a term of years and his term 
has expired (ad terminum qui preteriit); he was granted the land by the demandant’s 
husband whom she could not resist during his lifetime (cui in vita resistere non possit); he 
was granted the land by the demandant’s father, who was insane at the time (dum non 
compos mentis). Central royal court jurisdiction is appropriate in these cases because the 
demandant lord has chosen, by bringing the writ, not to proceed in his or her own court. 
This explanation covers almost all, though perhaps not quite all, of the writs of entry. 
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With this in mind let us look at the most famous clause in the 
Charter (c. 39)50: 
No free man [Nullus liber homo] is to be arrested, or 
imprisoned, or disseised, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any way 
destroyed, nor will we go against him, nor will we send against 
him, save by the lawful judgement of his peers or by the law of 
the land. 
There is much that is unclear about this clause, but we can say with 
reasonable confidence that “lawful judgement of his peers” does not 
mean jury trial. Petty juries for criminal cases were unknown in 
England at the time of Magna Carta. They did become a feature of 
 
I remain of the view that this is the most plausible general explanation of why writs 
precipe proliferate after 1216. Entry sur disseisin is a problem that probably requires 
another explanation, as does the development of the writ nuper obiit. The latter seems to 
be an evasion of the clause because it does not use the precipe form. For more details, see 
S. F. C. Milsom, Inheritance by Women, in ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 
60, 72–78 (Morris S. Arnold et al. eds., 1981). Milsom’s general explanation for why the 
lord chooses to bring the case in the central royal courts—that the availability of novel 
disseisin means that if he ousts the tenant he will immediately be sued by the ousted 
tenant and will be unable, for procedural reasons, to justify his action—may not cover all 
the reasons why lords chose to bring writs of entry. It almost certainly explains some, 
perhaps a great many, of them. Finally, Milsom may have chosen a bad example to 
illustrate his basic point about novel disseisin, the case of the Countess Amice. MILSOM, 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK, note 43 supra, at 45–47. It may be that the politics of that case were 
such that during the reign of King John there was no way in which the countess could have 
won. See Paul R. Hyams, Warranty and Good Lordship in Twelfth Century England, 5 
LAW & HIST. REV. 437, 494–96 (1987). Or it may be that the countess did not go through 
all the right procedural steps. See 2 HUDSON, OXFORD HISTORY, note 43 supra, 643–44. 
See generally id. at 559–60, 851, which raise issues that cannot be dealt with here. 
Holt’s interpretation of c. 34 emphasizes a different point, one not incompatible with 
this one. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA, note 5 supra, at ch. 5. Holt emphasizes the 
unpredictability of claims to hold in chief prior to Magna Carta. Whether John would hear 
the claim and what he would do if he did was a matter of politics not law. The 
development of the writ of right in capite after 1216 gave those claiming to hold in chief 
the same writ of course with a fixed fee that had been available on the same terms for 
those who claimed to hold of them for more than half a century. Holt certainly has 
examples of John acting in an arbitrary fashion toward those who claimed to hold of him. 
Holt did not, however, go through the plea rolls systematically looking for claims to hold 
in chief that were probably initiated by Glanvill’s writ of first summons, nor did he come 
to grips with what happened after Magna Carta with cases brought under the new form of 
precipe in capite, particularly where the tenant claimed royal warranty. Holt’s argument is 
plausible. I’m not sure that it is quite proved, and perhaps granted the state of the 
evidence, it cannot be. 
 50. Nullus liber homo capiatur, vel imprisonetur, aut dissaisiatur, aut 
utlaghetur, aut exuletur, aut aliquo modo destruatur, nec super eum 
ibimus, nec super eum mittemus, nisi per legale iuditium parium suorum 
vel per legem terre. 
CARPENTER, MAGNA CARTA, note 5 supra, at 52; translation in id. at 53. 
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criminal trials shortly after John’s death, but the way in which that 
happened shows that Magna Carta had nothing to do with it.51 We 
would, I think, be closer to the mark if we remembered that the court 
of the king in John’s time was still conceived of as a feudal court, a 
court for those who held land from him, the tenants-in-chief. Before a 
great lord, including the king, acted against one of his tenants, he was 
supposed to consult with, perhaps even obtain the judgment of, the 
tenant’s peers, i.e., the co-tenants of the tenant whom the lord 
believed had done wrong.52 But if this is the procedure to be followed 
with tenants-in-chief, what, then, of those who were not tenants-in-
chief, for the clause speaks of all free men? For these there were 
various procedures, established by the “law of the land,” of which the 
most important was that laid down in Henry the Second’s Assize of 
Clarendon of 1166.53 That assize established the ancestor of our grand 
jury procedure. It is not the least of the ironies of Magna Carta 
interpretation that the phrase that is normally taken to refer to jury 
procedure does not; it refers to something more like the modern “due 
process,” and the phrase which does refer to jury procedure, or at 
least to its ancestor, is now taken as referring to due process.54 But if 
we stop here, we may be missing the point. Does clause 39 represent a 
commitment to what we would call the rule of law in a feudal 
context? One certainly may think that it does. 
 
 51. See J. H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 5, 73, 505–08 
(4th ed. 2002). There was some experimentation with the use of sworn verdicts of 
neighbors in criminal cases prior to the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215. This 
experimentation probably made it easier for England to accept the decision of the council 
that the clergy were not to participate in ordeals and to move, instead, to the use of the 
petty jury. See Roger D. Groot, The Early-Thirteenth-Century Criminal Jury, in TWELVE 
GOOD MEN AND TRUE: THE CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY IN ENGLAND, 1200–1800, at 3 (J. S. 
Cockburn & T. A. Green eds., 1988); Roger D. Groot, The Jury in Private Criminal 
Prosecutions Before 1215, 27 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 113 (1983). 
 52. See the references collected note 54 infra. 
 53. STUBBS, SELECT CHARTERS, note 6 supra, at 170–73. 
 54. This interpretation was first suggested to me by J. E. A. JOLLIFFE, THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL ENGLAND FROM THE ENGLISH SETTLEMENT 
TO 1485, at 253–54 (4th ed. 1961) [hereinafter JOLLIFFE, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY]. 
More recent work has convinced me that it is probably right, though we should remember 
that the vel of the Latin is conjunctive (“either or both”). Hudson suggests that the clause 
gave tenants-in-chief something that ordinary people already had by “the law of land,” at 
least as a legal matter. 2 HUDSON, OXFORD HISTORY, note 43 supra, at 852. Holt is 
unconvinced that the clause accomplished anything, at least in the short run. HOLT, 
MAGNA CARTA, note 5 supra, at 276–79. The history of the idea of iudcium parium is old, 
deep, and obscure. We would certainly be wrong if we confined its use to the feudal courts 
of lords judging their tenants. See CARPENTER, MAGNA CARTA, note 5 supra, at 251–52; 
2 HUDSON, OXFORD HISTORY, note 43 supra, at 417, 570, 851–52; PETER COSS, 
LORDSHIP, KNIGHTHOOD, AND LOCALITY: A STUDY IN ENGLISH SOCIETY, C. 1180–C. 
1280, at 8 (1991). 
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So what shall we say about Magna Carta? Is it, as historians of 
the last generation were inclined to believe, simply an illustration of 
one of those documents that was pulled out of context and subjected 
to ever-increasingly anachronistic interpretation in order to make it 
solve problems that it was never designed to solve? We may point to 
three characteristics of the document and of the events that surround 
it that suggest, if they do not dictate, the developments that were to 
come: 
First, there are few references in the Charter to individual 
grievances. In this it stands in marked contrast to the settlements that 
the king, or those speaking in his name, had consented to before 1215. 
There is, for example, the so-called Treaty of Winchester of 1153, 
which brought Henry II to the throne, or the settlement of 1191, 
made during Richard the First’s reign between John and the king’s 
chief justiciar.55 Each of these is characterized by, on the one hand, 
individual details (so-and-so is to get this castle) and, on the other 
hand, the broadest of generalities (justice and right ought to prevail, 
evil customs should be rooted out). Magna Carta, by contrast, 
operates at a middle level of detail. The death duty for an earldom 
will be £100, not the earl of Arundel will pay a £100 or all charges will 
be reasonable.56 Finding the right level of generality is an essential if 
there is to be a rule of law.57 The drafters of Magna Carta did not 
succeed in every clause, but they made a good start. In this regard, we 
might focus on the happy fortuity of the phrase nullus liber homo, “no 
free man,” in the due process clause.58 It can hardly be thought that 
 
 55. The Treaty of Winchester may be found in 3 REGESTA REGUM ANGLO-
NORMANORUM [Records of the Anglo-Norman Kings] 97–99 (1968), translated in 2 
ENGLISH HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS 436–39 (David C. Douglas & George W. Greenaway 
eds., 2d ed. 1981); the Settlement of 1191 in 3 CHRONICA MAGISTRI ROGERI DE 
HOUEDENE [Chronicles of Master Roger of Hoveden] 135–37 (W. Stubbs ed., 1870), 
translated in 3 ENGLISH HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS 66–67 (David C. Douglas & Harry 
Rothwell eds., 1975). Neither of these documents is included in STUBBS, SELECT 
CHARTERS, note 6 supra; he apparently did not regard them as “constitutional.” He did 
include the Coronation Charter of Henry I, which has some claim to being regarded as a 
predecessor to Magna Carta in the way in which it is phrased and the topics that it covers. 
Id. at 117–19; see also note 61 infra. He also included the two Coronation Charters of 
Stephen and that of Henry II. Stubbs regarded them as referring back to the charter of 
Henry I, but in their wording they are mostly broad, and quite vague, generalities. 
STUBBS, SELECT CHARTERS, note 6 supra, at 142–44, 157.  
 56. MAGNA CARTA, c. 2 (1215). 
 57. This characteristic of dealing with the middle level of generality was enhanced in 
the subsequent reissues when all the clauses specific to John were removed (cc. 49, 50, 51, 
52, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59), and the provisions concerning the forest, which were scattered and 
not particularly coherent in the 1215 Charter (cc. 44, 47, 48, 53), were incorporated in a 
separate and more comprehensive Forest Charter. 
 58. MAGNA CARTA, c. 39 (1215); note 50 supra and accompanying text. 
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the barons were particularly concerned with every free peasant in 
England, but the fragmentation of feudal tenures had meant that the 
greatest baron might hold some land quite far down in the feudal 
chain. When forced to generalize, the barons perceived that they had 
a common interest with all free men in the kingdom.59 
Second, the process that led to the Charter was like that of a 
parliamentary petition. The barons proposed a written series of 
articles. The king, after some negotiation, accepted at least some of 
them, and the whole was issued in a public document. We must be 
careful. Magna Carta was not a parliamentary statute. Parliament, 
even in the broad sense of the ancestor of the institution that England 
has today, does not appear until toward the end of Henry the Third’s 
reign in the 1250s.60 Nonetheless, the process that was used in 1215 
seems to foreshadow that of parliamentary petition.61 
Third, the barons seem to have been confronting a problem for 
which we have no better term than the relationship of sovereignty and 
 
 59. This interpretation obviously depends on what we imagine the barons thought 
“liber homo” meant. The term clearly goes deeper into the society than the knights, 
barons, and earls who feature so prominently in the Charter. Whether it was intended to 
deal only with those who held land by free tenure or whether it was intended to deal only 
with those who were personally free is unclear. In 1217 the disseisin clause was amended 
to exclude those, of whatever personal status, who held by unfree tenure. As a very rough 
estimate, we might imagine that about half the population, perhaps a bit less, was not 
included among liberi homines. See CARPENTER, MAGNA CARTA, note 5 supra, at 107–
15, who emphasizes how much the barons were protecting their rights over the unfree. 
 60. Of a large literature on this topic, the one that I still find convincing about the 
date is G. O. SAYLES, THE KING’S PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND (New York, 1974).  
 61. This argument is made, with considerably more subtlety, in J. C. Holt, Magna Carta 
and the Origins of Statute Law, 15 STUDIA GRATIANA 487 (1972), reprinted in J. C. HOLT, 
MAGNA CARTA AND MEDIEVAL GOVERNMENT 289, 289–307 (1985) [hereinafter HOLT, 
MAGNA CARTA AND MEDIEVAL GOVERNMENT]. How close the analogy is depends on 
how we characterize the various surviving preliminary documents for Magna Carta, when we 
date them, and when we imagine that they might have been used. Holt’s introduction to his 
edition of the “Articles of the Barons” gives a good sense of the complexities involved. 
HOLT, MAGNA CARTA, note 5 supra, at 356–59; the original of the Articles may be viewed 
online at BRITISH LIBR.,	 http://www.bl.uk/manuscripts/FullDisplay.aspx?Source=Browse
Scribes&letter=A&ref=Add_MS_4838 [http://perma.cc/W9MA-LU9U]. This is not a problem 
that we are going to solve in a footnote. Suffice it to say here that the simple analogy, that the 
Articles are the petition and the official copy of the Charter the statute, works only in a quite 
extended sense. The Articles purport to be something to which the king has already agreed 
(and which he sealed), not a petition that the king agree to something. If we move back 
further in the chain of preliminary documents to the “Unknown Charter,” we encounter the 
same problem. This curious document combines an imperfect transcription of the 
Coronation Oath of Henry I and a series of clauses in the same format as the Coronation 
Oath that are said to have been agreed to by John; The Unknown Charter, in HOLT, MAGNA 
CARTA, note 5 supra, at 345–55 app. 4 (edited with an introduction). 
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the rule of law. They would have understood neither term.62 Let us 
pose a question that they would have understood: How do you make 
the lord who has no lord follow the law? The problem was certainly 
not solved by Magna Carta, but a perception of the problem may be 
there. 
It has even been suggested that there are some remarkable 
parallels in the intellectual background surrounding the Charter and 
that surrounding the confrontation between James I and, particularly, 
Charles I and Parliament in the seventeenth century.63 I can only 
recite a few of them here: 
(1) Both efforts seem to have begun with considerable interest in 
the “ancient law,” i.e., Anglo-Saxon law, law that antedated the 
Norman Conquest. A number of manuscripts of the Leges Edwardi 
Confessoris and the Leges Henrici Primi date from the end of the 
twelfth century. These could not possibly have been relevant for 
contemporary legal purposes, but they may have been relevant to an 
ongoing political debate.64 
(2) Constitutional thought in the seventeenth century was 
characterized, at least in some circles, by the story of the Norman 
yoke, the story that the Normans destroyed the pristine liberty of the 
Anglo-Saxons. There are some striking parallels to this story in 
chronicle accounts roughly contemporary with Magna Carta.65 
(3) Magna Carta appears at the beginning of statute books in the 
seventeenth century. It had been there since the beginning of the 
fourteenth. In the early thirteenth century, it appears at the end of 
books of collections of royal coronation charters. In the one case we 
have the beginning of a process; in the other an end. Neither is quite 
right but both show the importance attached to the document.66 
(4) Magna Carta speaks of “custom.” In the thirteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, as today, “custom” can mean “tallage,” like 
 
 62. That does not mean that no one at the time could have understood the problem 
more theoretically. As is well known, the treatise called Bracton, most of which seems to 
have been written within twenty years of the date of Magna Carta, has a number of 
passages that pose the problem quite starkly, though, of course, it does not use the terms 
“sovereignty” and “rule of law.” 2 BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS 
ANGLIE, fols. 7a, 34a–34b, 55b–56a, 107a–107b, translated in 2 BRACTON ON THE LAWS 
AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 33, 109–10, 166–67, 304–06 (G. Woodbine ed., S. Thorne 
trans., 1968) [hereinafter 2 BRACTON].  
 63. Most of this is derived from J. C. HOLT, The Origins of the Constitutional 
Tradition in England, in HOLT, MAGNA CARTA AND MEDIEVAL GOVERNMENT, note 61 
supra, at 1–22. 
 64. See HOLT, supra note 63, at 12–18. 
 65. See id. at 3–12. 
 66. See id. at 14–15, 18–19. 
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the customs that you have to pay when you bring goods into the 
country from abroad. “Custom” also means customary law or 
practice. These two ideas came together in Magna Carta. In the 
debates in the seventeenth century they came together again over the 
king’s power to levy customs outside of Parliament.67 
I promised at the beginning that I would try to suggest a meaning 
for Magna Carta that would say that both Stubbs and the revisionists 
of the last generation were right. There is far less agreement among 
historians about this than there is about what I said previously, but let 
me close by at least offering it. Stubbs exaggerated the evils of King 
John. This made it easier for him to see the connection between the 
events of 1215 and those of 1642. A dramatically bad king produced 
something totally out of the context of the time. The revisionists 
exaggerated John’s good qualities. This made it easier for them to see 
Magna Carta as a basically feudal document and hence irrelevant to 
the events of 1642. Modern historians see John as a middling-run bad 
king and agree with the previous generation that we must interpret 
the Charter in the light of the conceptual economy of the time, not 
that of 1642. The question is does that deprive us of any continuity, 
except in the broad sense that we have just suggested? 
It has recently been suggested, partly as a result of our new 
understanding of Magna Carta, that Henry II was not trying to 
destroy lords’ courts, much less “the feudal system,” whatever that 
might mean.68 His vision, in this view, was much narrower. He offered 
an appellate jurisdiction in his courts in order to enforce a body of 
customary rules that everyone agreed were what the lords’ courts 
ought to be following but which sometimes they failed to follow. In 
short, all that Henry II was trying to do was to make the system work 
in its own terms, to make the barons obey the rules as all agreed they 
were. Everyone agreed that someone should not be disseised 
“unjustly and without a judgment,” to quote the language of the 
assize of novel dissesin.69 The question was how to prevent that from 
 
 67. See id. 19–21. Holt is too cautious to draw the connection with the debate over 
customs on imports in the seventeenth century, but the possibility of a connection seems 
to be there. 
 68. What follows is a crude attempt to summarize the views of S. F. C. Milsom. They 
deserve better than this, and perhaps the best way to get at them is to read his most 
abstract statement of them: A NATURAL HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW (2003) and two 
papers that he wrote at the end of his career when he finally came out and said more 
explicitly what his disagreements were with F. W. Maitland, Maitland, 60 CAMB. L.J. 265 
(2001); S. F. C. Milsom, ‘Pollock and Maitland’: A Lawyer’s Retrospect, in THE HISTORY 
OF ENGLISH LAW: CENTENARY ESSAYS ON “POLLOCK AND MAITLAND” 243 (1996). 
 69. GLANVILL, note 43 supra, at 167. 
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happening. Now if this was Henry’s purpose, then Magna Carta 
becomes more understandable. The barons are saying to the king, 
“You are making us obey the rules; you have to obey the rules too.” 
The problem was devising a mechanism for making this happen, 
and such a mechanism was hard to come by in the feudal world.70 So 
just as Henry the Second’s attempt to make the feudal world work in 
its own terms had unintended consequences, so too the barons’ 
attempts to make the feudal world work in its own terms from their 
point of view was to have unintended consequences. It took five 
centuries to work it out, but once posed the problem would not go 
away. Thus, Stubbs was not totally wrong in seeing Magna Carta as 
having something to do with Parliament or even “the whole of 
English constitutional history.” What he was wrong about was 
thinking that the barons saw what he, with the advantage of hindsight, 
saw. 
Magna Carta in a Wider Contemporary Context 
There is a final point about Magna Carta suggested by the most 
recent work: Stubbs and many more recent historians saw Magna 
Carta as a uniquely English document. They did not look very far. 
Between 1183 and 1283 the following charters of liberties were 
proposed or adopted on the European Continent71: 
Treaty of Constance (1183) 
Charter of Alfonso IX of León (1188) 
Draft charter of Peter II of Aragon (1205) 
Charter of Frederick II (1220) 
 
 70. The mechanism that they did choose was a council of twenty-five barons who 
would act as a kind of appellate court or board of directors over the king (c. 61). This 
didn’t work, and it was abandoned in the 1216 reissue. It may, however, be what is being 
referred to in a mysterious passage in Bracton where the author says that if the king is 
“without a bridle,” the earls and barons ought to put a bridle on him. 2 BRACTON, note 62 
supra, at 110 (“Et ideo si rex fuerit sine fræno, id est sine lege, debent [comites et barones] 
ei frænum apponere	.	.	.	.”). Similar mechanisms were tried at the time of the Barons’ Wars 
in the mid-thirteenth century and with the Ordinances of 1311. Neither of these 
mechanisms worked either, and the ultimate solution, if such it can be called, proved to be 
a combination of parliament and the permanent or semi-permanent bureaucracy. (The 
bibliography on this topic is very large, particularly if we reach for “the ultimate solution” 
in the Tudor and Stuart periods or beyond. One way of getting at it is to start with the 
older “constitutional” histories, e.g., JOLLIFFE, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, note 54 
supra, and DAVID LINDSAY KEIR, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF MODERN 
BRITAIN SINCE 1485 (9th ed. 1969), and then fill in with the “Further Reading” suggested 
in MARTIN LOUGHLIN, THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 
(2013)). 
 71. This list is drawn from HOLT, MAGNA CARTA, note 5 supra, at 50–52. 
94 N.C. L. REV. 1521 (2016) 
1542 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94 
“Golden Bull” of Hungary (1222) 
Charter of Henry VII of Germany (1231) 
Charters after the Sicilian Vespers (1282–83) 
More controversially, R. H. Helmholz has gone through the 
provisions of Magna Carta and has argued that no fewer than forty of 
the sixty-three provisions, almost two-thirds, are “congruent” with the 
learned law, the Roman and canon law formally taught in what were 
rapidly becoming universities.72 “Congruent” is the word that he 
uses.73 In a few cases the terminology used is that of Roman and 
canon law; in other cases there are ideas that appear in Roman and 
canon law and are not found in native English sources before 1215; in 
many cases it is an idea that can be found in both types of sources, 
some quite specific some more general. An example of shared 
terminology might be the guarantee of the libertas ecclesiae, found in 
clauses 1 and 60, and the specific guarantee of freedom of 
ecclesiastical elections found in clause 1. An example of the ideas 
appearing in Roman and canon law but not in earlier English sources 
might be the notion found in clause 9 that one must proceed against 
the principal debtor before proceeding against his sureties. An 
example of a specific idea shared by Roman and English law might be 
the removal of obstructions to navigation in the Thames and Medway 
(c. 33), found in London charters prior to 1215, but extended to the 
whole kingdom in Magna Carta. An example of a more general 
shared idea might be the commitment to due process in clause 39. 
I have said that Helmholz’s ideas are controversial. Some of the 
criticisms seem to me to mistake his point. It is certainly true that the 
fact that clause 9 is not phrased in the way in which similar ideas are 
found in texts of Roman and canon law is some evidence that it is not 
directly and consciously borrowed from those laws, but the same 
author who makes this point goes on to show that a decretal letter 
directed to England had incorporated the same doctrine.74 Ideas can 
influence shorn of the texts in which they are incorporated, 
 
 72. Richard H. Helmholz, Magna Carta and the ius commune, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 297, 
355, 358, 363 (1999). 
 73. Id.  
 74. Thomas J. McSweeney, Magna Carta, Civil Law, and Canon Law, in MAGNA 
CARTA AND THE RULE OF LAW 287–91, 302–04 (Daniel Barstow Magraw et al. eds., 
2014). The author’s statement on the last page that there are no surviving English church 
court records from the time of Magna Carta is not quite right. See SELECT CASES FROM 
THE ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS OF THE PROVINCE OF CANTERBURY pt. A, 1–48 (N. 
Adams & C. Donahue eds., Selden Society no. 95, 1981). None discovered so far, however, 
deals with the issue that McSweeney mentions.  
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particularly if the gist of the idea is transmitted orally. Others seem to 
have taken the principal point of the article to be the suggestion in it 
that we might look to Langton and his familia as being among the 
people who might have brought knowledge of Roman and canon law 
to the negotiating table.75 Hence, another author is at pains to limit 
what he describes as “influence” to a few clauses in the Charter, 
mostly those that concern the clergy or deal with specific canonical 
institutions, such as the church supervision of the distribution of 
chattels of the deceased.76 He is quite right that the word “delictum” 
(c. 20), which is not in a clause concerning the clergy and is an 
unusual word in the technical terminology of native English law at the 
time, could have been derived from the Bible or be a back formation 
from French “délit,” but he fails to explain how “appellatione 
remota,” a technical term in canon law, made it into the Articles of 
Barons (c. 25), also a provision that does not concern the clergy.77 
(The phrase was eliminated in the parallel clause 52 of the Charter, 
presumably as being totally inappropriate in an English context.) 
More basically, “congruence” and “influence” are not the same 
thing, particularly if one will see influence only where one can clearly 
see conscious borrowing, as Helmholz’s critics seem to be assuming. 
But influence and borrowing are not necessarily the same thing. 
Influence can be, and frequently is, mutual. Congruence and 
 
 75. My own view, which certainly could change, is that Langton was probably not 
directly involved in drafting Magna Carta, except for cc. 1 and 60, and he may well have 
seen to it that some references to him were taken out of the Articles of the Barons. See 
note 16 supra. That probably makes it unlikely that members of his familia were so 
involved. Knowledge, however, of the ius commune was widespread in England in this 
period, and that knowledge was not confined to the clergy. Geoffrey fitz Peter, the chief 
justiciar until his death in 1213, was very much a layman, but if he was, as many suspect, 
the author of Glanvill, he had some acquaintance with Roman and canon law and was in a 
position to find out more. My own suspicion, moreover, is that the actual drafting of the 
Charter was not done by the principal players, the men whose names appear in the 
Charter or who ultimately became members of the council of twenty-five, but by 
subordinates, some of whom could have been quite learned, perhaps more learned than 
their superiors. Many of these, of course, would have been clergy. This was a period in 
which the overlap between a clerk, in the sense of someone who writes something, and a 
cleric, in the sense of someone who was at least in minor orders, was almost complete. 
 76. John Hudson, Magna Carta, the ius commune, and English Common Law, in 
MAGNA CARTA AND THE ENGLAND OF KING JOHN, note 3 supra, at 102–05. 
 77. Id. at 104, 106, 108–10. These are not the only points that McSweeney and Hudson 
make, but they are the ones that take up the most space in their articles. In both cases, in 
my view, they support the point that the ius commune is probably not the only thing that 
explains cc. 9 and 20, but they do not seem to exclude the possibility that it is one of the 
things that does. It is only if one adopts a particularly rigorous form of Ockham’s Razor 
that one can exclude what seems to be a relevant element of context. See further the next 
paragraph. 
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influence also blend, particularly where one is dealing with higher 
levels of abstraction, such as the due process clause of the Charter, or 
the notion of majority rule (c. 61), or the idea that one authorized to 
hear a case might also be authorized to delegate that function (c. 55). 
Congruence without a hint of influence can also occur when the 
structures of a society and the background ideas are such that men 
faced with a similar problem come up with the same or similar 
solutions.78 Nobody is suggesting—nor should anyone suggest—that 
the draft charter of Peter II of Aragon of 1205 influenced the making 
of Magna Carta, or that Magna Carta influenced the Golden Bull of 
Hungary of 1222, but the fact that three European kingdoms thought 
about, or adopted, charters of liberties within seventeen years of each 
other calls for an explanation. 
The congruence is there. That would suggest, once more, that 
Magna Carta was very much a document of its time. It also suggests, 
however, that we make a serious mistake if we think that the 
conceptual economy of customary feudal law is the only conceptual 
economy of the time and the only one reflected in the document.79 
 
 78. Helmholz himself makes this point quite nicely in THE IUS COMMUNE IN 
ENGLAND: FOUR STUDIES 240–43 (2001). 
 79. A recent and still-unpublished paper by Kenneth Pennington makes the same point 
by carefully examining the language of the first translation of Magna Carta into French. 
Kenneth Pennington, Reform in 1215: Magna Carta and the Fourth Lateran Council, 
http://scholarship.law.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1929&context=scholar	
[http://perma.cc/2GGD-UUS9]	 (unpublished paper given at the Dartmouth College 
Conference on Magna Carta, Nov. 7, 2015). 
